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OF DEFENDANTS FOUND NOT GUILTY
BY REASON OF INSANITY
State v. Kee1
Joseph Kee was charged with robbery in the first degree. After a
psychiatric examination, Kee entered a plea of not guilty by reason f
mental disease or defect excluding responsibility.2 The circuit court con-
sidered the report of the mental examination, accepted Kee's plea, and
committed Kee pursuant to section 552.040 (1) of the Revised Statutes
of Missouri.3 Following the procedures set out in section 552.040(4), Kee
filed an application for release from custody. Kee alleged that he no
longer suffered from a mental disease or defect rendering him dangerous
and that his original commitment violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. At a hearing, the circuit court found that Kee still suffered from
paranoid schizophrenia and held section 552.040 constitutional. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court upheld the lower court.
In Missouri if the defendant is acquitted on the basis of mental
disease or defect excluding responsibility, the verdict must so state.4 Such
a finding triggers section 552.040, which demands that the defendant be
committed to the Director of Mental Diseases. This criminal commitment
differs procedurally from civil commitment.5 The civil commitment statute6
requires that the potential patient be notified of the attempted commit-
ment, that he be given a hearing concerning his present mental condition
in probate court, that he be allowed to testify and cross-examine witnesses,
that he be examined by a physician within 20 days'of the application and
that the physician testify at the hearing, that he be provided with an at-
torney and attorney's fees if he cannot afford them, and that he have a
right to appeal the probate court's decision to circuit court. The allegedly
mentally ill person may demand a jury trial at circuit court. The burden
is on the applicant7 to prove that the potential patient is mentally ill,8 is
1. 510 S.W.2d 477 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
2. Pursuant to section 552.030, RSMo 1969.
3. Section 552.040 (1), RSMo 1969, provides:
When a defendant is acquitted on the ground of mental disease or defect
excluding responsibility, the court shall order such person to be com-
mitted to the director of mental diseases for custody, care and treatment
in a state mental hospital.
4. § 552.030 (8), RSMo 1969.
5. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process For the Criminally In-
sane in Missouri, 43 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 179, 184-87 (1974).
6. § 202.807, RSMo 1973 Supp.
7. State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Skinker, 344 Mo. 359, 365,.126 S.W.2d 1156,
1159 (1939).
8. Section 202.010 (12), RSMo 1969, defines "mental illness" as:
... a state of impaired mental function and includes alcoholism or other
drug abuse to such an extent that a person so afflicted requires care and
treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of others, and without re-
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'in need of custody, care, or treatment in a mental facility, and lacks suf-
ficient insight or capacity to make decisions with respect to his own
hospitalization.9 Civilly committed patients may at any time petition for
reconsideration of the commitment order10 or may be discharged when
the head of the hospital believes that it is justified."
Under criminal commitment proceedings there is no determination of
mental illness at the time of commitment. The finding that the defendant
was suffering from a mental disease or defect excluding responsibility at
*the time of the crime is enough for commitment.' 2 Also, there is no re-
quirement calling for a post-commitment hearing. The only way the de-
fendant can be released is if he, or the hospital superintendent, 'initiates a
'hearing at which the defendant has the burden of convincing the court'3
that he no longer has a mental defect rendering him dangerous.' 4 Further-
more, there are no provisions for jury trial, right to examine witnesses, right
to an attorney, or required examination or testimony by a physician.
Kee contended that the Missouri commitment statutes imposed an
unreasonable and arbitrary distinction between civil and criminal com-
mitment in violation of equal protection. In addition, Kee argued that
,failure to provide a pre-commitment hearing about his mental condition
at the time of commitment deprived him of due process.15
gard -to whether or not such person has been adjudicated legally incom-
petent.
.In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975), the Supreme Court stated that
'there is no constitutional basis for confining a mentally ill person involuntarily if
he is not dangerous and can live safely in freedom. This makes the Missouri
.statute of questionable constitutionality. See Bazelon, Institutionalization, Dein.
stitutionalization, and the Adversary Process, 75 COLUM. L. Rzv. 897 (1975).
9. § 202.807 (5), RSMo 1969.
10. § 202.837, RSMo 1969. This section also states that the hearing shall be
conducted in accordance with section 202.807; see Murphy v. Murphy, 358 S.W.2d
.778, 781-82 (Mo. 1962).
11. § 202.827, RSMo 1969.
12. Section 552.010, RSMo 1969, states:
The terms "mental disease or defect" include congenital and traumatic
mental conditions as well as disease. They do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct,
whether or not such abnormality may be included under mental illness,
mental disease or defect in some classifications of mental abnormality or
disorder. The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include alcoholism
without psychosis or drug abuse without psychosis or an abnormality
manifested only by criminal sexual psychopathy....
Section 552.030 (1), RSMo 1969, provides:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he did not know or ap-
predate the nature, quality or wrongfulness of his conduct or was incap.
able of conforming his conduct to the requirements of law.
13. State v. Montague, 510 S.W.2d 776, 778 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
14. § 552.040 (1), RSMo 1969.
15. 510 S.W.2d at 480. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955), points out that automatic commitment may ultimately benefit the




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 15
https://sc olarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss3/15
RECENT CASES
The landmark case on the commitment issue, Baxstrom v. Herold,16
was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1966. Baxstrom in-
volved a New York statute which allowed civil commitment of prisoners
nearing the end of their sentences under a procedure different from that
afforded to others civilly committed. The Court struck down the statute
as a violation of equal protection. It stated that although classification of
the mentally ill as either insane or dangerously insane may be a reason-
able distinction for determining the type of custodial or medical care to
be given, it has no relevance whatever in the context of the procedures em-
ployed to show whether a person is mentally ill at all."' Baxsfrom has
subsequently been interpreted to mean that dangerousness, as exhibited by
prior criminal conduct, cannot justify denial of procedural safeguards
for the determination of mental competence.18
Following Baxstrom, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in Bolton v. Harris,19 held that anyone found not guilty
by reason of instanity must be given a pre-commitment judicial hearing with
procedures "substantially similar" to those in civil commitment proceed-
ings.20 The court emphasized, however, that "relevant differences" between
the criminally and civilly committed patients would give rise to some dif-
ferences in procedure. For example, one found not guilty by reason of
insanity may be automatically committed for an adequate period of ob-
servation to determine his present mental condition.2 '
There are also due process considerations involved in mandatory
commitment. As Judge Seiler pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Kee,
we do not confine people without proving a case against them and then
make them prove that they should be released. 22 It is a basic due process
requirement that one is entitled to a hearing prior to deprivation of
liberty.23
Although the United States Supreme Court has not spoken directly
on the due process considerations in insanity acquittal cases, Specht v.
16. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). Prior to Baxstrom, in Lynch v. Oversholser, 369 U.S.
705 (1962), the Court construed a District of Columbia statute requiring commit-
ment of one found not guilty by reason of insanity as inapplicable where the
trial court raised the defense sua sponte. The Court stated that those who af-
firmatively rely on the defense are in a different position and that Congress might
have thought that such acquittees should be committed automatically to discour-
age false pleas of insanity and to require them to show that they have recovered.
However, the Court would go no further than to say that "such differentiating
considerations are pertinent to ascertaining the intended reach of the statutory
provision." Id. at 715.
17. 283 U.S. at 111.
18. Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see People V..
Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 224 N.E.2d 87 (1966).
19. 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
20. Id. at 649. The court noted that it makes no difference for commitment
purposes whether the plea of insanity is raised by the defendant, the prosecutor,
or the court. But see note 16 supra.
21. Id. at 651.
22. 510 S.W.2d at 484.
23. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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Patterson24 provides some guidelines in an analogous situation.. In. Specht
the defendant was convicted of indecent liberties under one statute, but
sentenced under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act to an indeterminate term.
The judge was allowed to sentence under that act if, based on a -psychiatric
examination, he -found the defendant to be a habitual sex offender and
mentally ill. The Supreme Court found that the act embodied a separate
criminal proceeding which may be .invoked after conviction of one of
the specified crimes and that in such a proceeding, the full panoply of
procedural safeguards was necessary to satisfy due process.
The Specht decision provides a foundation for ascertaining, the due
process requirements in mandatory commitment procedures. Both .situa-
ions involve institutionalization on the basis of prior criminal conduct
without inquiry into the separate set of facts which show the necessity of
immediate commitment. 25 The Specht -rationale would indicate that a trial
court conviction for the substantive offense cannot be used as, a basis for
hospitalizing the defendant as an insane person without affording him
adequate procedural safeguards.
Kee relied on Baxstrom, Bolton, and Specht in alleging that section
552.040 was unconstitutional. The Missouri Supreme Court distinguished
Baxstrom as being concerned with two different methods of civil commit-
ment, whereas Kee involved criminal versus civil commentment.26 Bolton
was distinguished on two bases. First, in Bolton the state had the burden
of proving that the defendant was sane at the time the crime was committed
and thus Bolton was dommitted even though there may have been only a
reasonable doubt as to his sanity at the time he committed the crime; in
Missouri, however, the defendant must prove affirmatively -that he was
insane by a preponderance of the evidence, thus making more reasonable
a presumption that the insanity continues at the time of acquittal.2 7 Sec-
ond, the statute in Bolton did not provide for a release hearing; whereas
insanity acquittees in Missouri may initiate a hearing immediately 'upon
commitment.2 8 Specht was dismissed as not involving a situation where
the defendant relied on an insanity defense.
The Kee court did not sufficiently confront the issues and problems
arising in'these cases. Distinguishing Baxstrom as involving two different
methods of civil commitment unlike Kee, .which involved both criminal and
civil commitment; is essentially labelling the procedures and saying, that dif-
24. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
25. See Note, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection and Due Process-Auto.
matic Commitment of a Defendant Found Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity,'1974
IWis. L. Rav. 1203, 1212.
26. 510 S.W.2d at 481.
27. Although section 552.030 (1), RSMo 1969, does not use the term ."insane,"
the writer uses this term to describe the legal conclusion which that section re.
quires to be reached in order to find that a person is not responsible for his
criminal conduct. That term is not used to describe the conclusion that ole is
mentally ill under section 202.807, RSMo 1969.
28. 510 S.W.2d at 482-83.
[Vol. 41
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ferent labels preclude comparison. 29 It is unfortunate that the court
distinguished Bolton. The focus of that opinion was giving insanity acquit-
tees a hearing into present mental condition, in spite of the degree of
certainty as to past insanity. Specht was barely mentioned other than a
statement of its facts.
The court in Kee quoted extensively from a Wisconsin case, State ex
rel. Schopf v. Schubert,30 which was subsequently overruled shortly after
the Kee decision.31 In overruling Schopf, the Wisconsin Supreme Court de-
cided that automatic commitment denied due process and equal protection.
It ordered that following an acquittal by reason of insanity the jury should
decide whether the defendant is presently mentally ill and in need of
treatment-the same finding required under the civil commitment statute.
The jury must be provided with proof based on examination of the de-
fendant's mental condition at the time of acquittal.32
Using the due process and equal protection principles expounded by
the preceding cases, mandatory commitment without certain procedural
safeguards is constitutionally suspect. Involuntary commitment in a men-
tal institution is a deprivation of liberty which the state cannot accomplish
without due process of law.3 3 The extent of the required procedural pro-
tections depends on a judicious weighing of the individual's interest in
maintaining his liberty against the state's interest in depriving him of it. 34
Although the state's interest in protecting its citizens from one who has
been found to have been insane in the recent past may outweigh the
individual's interest in freedom so as to justify temporary commitment, it
does not justify permanent commitment without providing adequate pro-
cedural safeguards.
In upholding statutes affording insanity acquitees fewer procedural
safeguards than others, many courts have relied on the presumption of
29. See Note, The Rights of the Person Acquitted by Reason of Insanity:
Equal Protection and Due Process, 24 ME. L. REv. 135, 138-39 (1972).
30. 45 Wis. 2d 644, 173 N.W.2d 673 (1970).
31. State ex rel. Kovach v. Schubert, 64 Wis. 2d 612, 622, 219 N.W.2d 341,
346 (1974).
32. Id. at 622-23, 219 N.W'2d at 346. The court found that approval of Bol-
ton could be inferred from a reference to that case in Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715 (1972): "The Baxstrom principle has also been extended to commitment fol-
lowing an insanity acquittal." Id. at 724 (citing Bolton). The Jackson Court
said: "Baxstrom held that the State cannot withhold from a few the procedural
protections or the substantive requirements for commitment that are available
to all others." Id: at 727. Both references are dicta. The court in Kovach also dis-
cussed Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), where the Supreme Court con-
sidered the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act commitment procedure which, unlike the
civil commitment statute, did not provide for a jury determination of the need
for commitment. The Court found that although initial commitment under the
Sex Crimes Act was arguably a justifiable alternative to sentencing, commitment
beyond the normal prison term would require civil commitment because the two
methods of confinement appeared to require the same kind of determination.
33. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608 (1967).
34. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
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continuing insanity.35 Although presuming that the defendant who was
found to have been insane at the time he committed the crime is still in-
sane at the time of commitment may be reasonable in many instances, it is
not always valid. Even showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant was insane when the crime was committed should not be
conclusive of his insanity at the time of commitment. He may have re-
covered in the interval between the commission of the crime and commit-
ment. The fact that the defendant was found mentally capable of stand-
ing trial, even though generally based on a lower standard of proof than
the insanity defense,30 may, nevertheless, indicate that he has improved.
Baxstrom and its progeny reject the idea that past criminal conduct
gives rise to a presumption of continuing insanity. In Specht there was a
reasonable presumption that a person convicted of indecent liberties con-
stituted a threat of harm to the public, yet the Supreme Court required a
pre-commitment hearing.
The fourteenth amendment does not require that things different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same.37 But it does require
that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated. Equal protection
demands that legislative classification be reasonable in light of the purpose
of the law.38 The Kee court pointed out that the purposes of compulsory
commitment are protecting society from the defendant and providing him
with medical treatment.3 9 These purposes seem to be similar to those of
civil commitment. The issue is whether there are sufficient differences
between the two groups to warrant substantially different commitment pro-
cedures. There is a difference in that one has been found to have committed
a crime while the other is only potentially dangerous. However, Baxstrom
said that prior criminal conduct cannot serve as a basis of classification for
commitment purposes. It is arguable that Baxstrom is different because
there was no connection between the individual's mental condition and his
criminal act. However, Bolton involved a situation where there was such
a link, and the court found substantially different procedures to be un-
reasonable. Many states have followed Bolton's extension of Baxstrom by
35. In Kee the court said: "When this kind of conduct is engaged in as a con-
sequence of mental defect, it is reasonable to believe that it may be repeated until
the defendant is cured." 510 S.W.2d at 480. See Comment, Commitment Following
Acquittal By Reason of Insanity and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 116 U. PA.
L. Rx-v. 924, 935-36 (1968).
36. Under section 552.020 (1), RSMo 1969, a defendant is capable of stand-
ing trial if he understands the charges against him and can assist in his own de-
fense. See Drope v. Missouri, 95 S. Ct. 396 (1975).
37. Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); see Tussman & ten Broek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 344 (1939).
38. Although the fundamental interest of liberty would seem to require the
strict scrutiny test, the United States Supreme Court has consistently used the ra-
tional basis test in examining mental health laws. See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 106, 111 (1966).
39. 510 S.W.2d at 484. The state's interest in discouraging false pleas of in-
sanity has been cited as another rationale for mandatory commitment, but this
problem can be best dealt with using the less onerous burden of a pretrial ex-
amination or by imposing a greater burden for obtaining an insanity acquittal.
[Vol. 41
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holding that insanity acquittees must be afforded the same procedural.safe-
guards as civilly committed persons.4 0
It is difficult to see how the goals of caring for incompetent persons
and protecting society would be impeded by granting uniform procedural
safeguards to the civilly committed and to insanity acquittees, except, as
Bolton recognizes, where there are "relevant differences."
Such terms as "substantial similarity" and "relevant differences" pro-
vide a degree of flexibility in dealing with insanity acquittees. Thus, the
state's interest in protecting society is sufficient to justify temporary de-
tention in order to determine present mental condition. However, in order
to justify permanent institutionalization, a prompt post-detention hearing
should be required. Specht requires reasonable notice, right to counsel,
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and right to a meaning-
ful record for review.41 Bolton requires a right to jury trial and any other
procedures necessary to give insanity acquittees protection "substantially
similar" to that afforded the civilly committed. Some jurisdictions require
that the patient have the burden of proving that he is no longer insane.
But this is based largely on the discredited presumption of continuing in-
sanity.4 2 The better view is to place the burden on the state to prove the
acquittee's insanity as in civil commitment.43
As the foregoing suggests, section 552.040 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri is procedurally deficient. The insanity acquittee may initiate a
hearing immediately upon commitment. Although this provision arguably
satisfies the "substantially similar" test, it does not satisfy due process.
There should be a mandatory hearing within a reasonable time after
commitment. The nature of the hearing provided under section 552.040 is
not discussed in the statute and was not considered in Kee. At a minimum,
the post-commitment hearing should provide the Specht procedures. In addi-
tion, safeguards afforded civilly committed persons should be provided. As
Judge Seiler said in his dissenting opinion, the hearing must be an op-
portunity for a genuine test of whether the defendant should be perma-
nently committed.44
MARK T. STOLL
40. See State v. Clemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 515 P.2d 324 (1973); Wilson v. State,
287 N.E.2d 875 (Ind. 1972); People v. McQuillan, 395 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d
569 (1974); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); People v. McNally,
371 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1975); Holderbaum v. Watkins, 71 Ohio. Op. 2d 833, 42 Ohio
St. 2d 372, 328 N.E.2d 814 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. DiEmilio v. Shovlin, 449
Pa. 177, 295 A.2d 320 (1972).
41. 386 U.S. at 610.
42. See, e.g., In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562, 496
P.2d 465, 474 (1972).
43. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that while the District has the burden of proof, a lower standard of proof could
be used to commit insanity acquittees than civilly committed patients. United
States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). There was a vigorous dis-
sent by Judge J. Skelly Wright.
44. 510 S.W.2d at 485.
1976]
7
Stoll: Stoll: Criminal Procedure--Automatic Commitment
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
